Giving Amazon Managed Service for Prometheus permission to send messages to your Amazon SNS topic
You must give Amazon Managed Service for Prometheus permission to send messages to your Amazon SNS topic. The following policy
statement includes a Condition
statement to help prevent the confused deputy
security problem. The Condition
statement restricts access to the Amazon SNS topic to allow only operations
coming from this specific account and Amazon Managed Service for Prometheus workspace. For more information about the confused deputy problem, see
Cross-service confused deputy
prevention.
To give Amazon Managed Service for Prometheus permission to send messages to your Amazon SNS topic
Open the Amazon SNS console at https://console.aws.amazon.com/sns/v3/home
. In the navigation pane, choose Topics.
Choose the name of the topic that you are using with Amazon Managed Service for Prometheus.
Choose Edit.
Choose Access policy and add the following policy statement to the existing policy.
{ "Sid": "Allow_Publish_Alarms", "Effect": "Allow", "Principal": { "Service": "aps.amazonaws.com" }, "Action": [ "sns:Publish", "sns:GetTopicAttributes" ], "Condition": { "ArnEquals": { "aws:SourceArn": "
workspace_ARN
" }, "StringEquals": { "AWS:SourceAccount": "account_id
" } }, "Resource": "arn:aws:sns:region
:account_id
:topic_name
" }[Optional] If your SNS topic is service side encryption (SSE) enabled, you need to add the following permissions to your KMS key policy in the
"Action"
block. For more information, see AWS KMS Permissions for SNS Topic.kms:GenerateDataKey kms:Decrypt
Choose Save changes.
By default, Amazon SNS creates the access policy with condition on AWS:SourceOwner
. For more information, see SNS Access Policy.
IAM follows the Most-restrictive policy first rule. In your SNS topic, if there is a policy block that is more restrictive than the documented Amazon SNS policy block, the permission for the topic policy is not granted. To evaluate your policy and find out what's been granted, see Policy evaluation logic.
Cross-service confused deputy prevention
The confused deputy problem is a security issue where an entity that doesn't have permission to perform an action can coerce a more-privileged entity to perform the action. In AWS, cross-service impersonation can result in the confused deputy problem. Cross-service impersonation can occur when one service (the calling service) calls another service (the called service). The calling service can be manipulated to use its permissions to act on another customer's resources in a way it should not otherwise have permission to access. To prevent this, AWS provides tools that help you protect your data for all services with service principals that have been given access to resources in your account.
We recommend using the aws:SourceArn
and aws:SourceAccount
global condition context keys in resource
policies to limit the permissions that Amazon Managed Service for Prometheus gives to Amazon SNS to the
resource. If you use both global condition context keys, the aws:SourceAccount
value and the account in the aws:SourceArn
value must use the same account ID
when used in the same policy statement.
The value of aws:SourceArn
must be the ARN of the Amazon Managed Service for Prometheus workspace.
The most effective way to protect against the confused deputy problem is to use the
aws:SourceArn
global condition context key with the full ARN of the
resource. If you don't know the full ARN of the resource or if you are specifying multiple
resources, use the aws:SourceArn
global context condition key with wildcards
(*
) for the unknown portions of the ARN. For example,
arn:aws:
. servicename
::123456789012
:*
The policy shown in Giving Amazon Managed Service for Prometheus permission to send
messages to your Amazon SNS topic shows how you can use the aws:SourceArn
and
aws:SourceAccount
global condition context keys
in Amazon Managed Service for Prometheus to prevent
the confused deputy problem.